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RISK ASSESSMENT ALGORITHMS: THE ANSWER TO AN
INEQUITABLE BAIL SYSTEM?
Richard F. Lowden*
Debate over pretrial detention began long before ratification of
the Eighth Amendment, tracing its roots to the early English bail
system. Despite this, approaches to the system have largely
remained stagnant since passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
which contains a series of procedural directives that model bailsetting practices for the majority of jurisdictions today. However,
many courts have begun to insinuate that the current methods
represent a flawed, archaic, and biased system—burdening both
defendants and the community. A rise in the use of algorithms in
other areas of the criminal justice system has led some jurisdictions,
including Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, to abandon
traditional procedures in favor of data-driven risk assessment tools,
yielding promising results for the future of bail reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Excessive bail shall not be required.”1 While the opening words
to the Eighth Amendment may—at face value—appear quite clear,
their meaning has sparked a wide variety of interpretations from
both scholars and courts for decades. Despite the language of the
Eighth Amendment, developed case law affirms the principle that
an individual does not possess a constitutional right to be released
on bail.2 But for whom is this provision intended? In the federal
system, certain defendants found guilty of crimes enumerated in the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 may be statutorily barred from release.3 On
the opposite end of the spectrum are defendants who remain
detained pretrial, not because of the severity of their crime or the
risk they present to the community, but due to a systemic flaw in the
1

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987).
3
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) (2012). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 enhanced
protections for defendants held in custody solely for failure to satisfy monetary
conditions for release. However, the Act stipulates that it is presumed no
conditions are appropriate to ensure a defendant’s appearance or the safety of the
community if an individual has been charged with any of the enumerated offenses
listed in the subsection. The most notable exceptions include offenses with a
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more, specific crimes involving
minor victims, and drug trafficking activities. Id.
2
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traditional bail system as it stands today—they simply cannot afford
release.4 In searching for an equitable solution to bail reform that
maintains public safety, risk assessment algorithms5 have risen to
the forefront of the discussion. These algorithms seek to reform
existing methods of pretrial release by lowering crime rates and
reducing jail populations while enhancing judicial efficiency in the
process.
This Recent Development argues in favor of an algorithmic
approach to bail reform and introduces the steps that may be taken
to correct inequities in the pretrial release system utilized by the
majority of jurisdictions today. Part II provides a brief history of the
bail system and the emergence of algorithms as part of the criminal
process. Part III assesses the real-world effectiveness and impact of
bail algorithms through Mecklenburg County’s implementation of
the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment. Part IV outlines
the benefits of employing bail algorithms, while also recognizing
the possibility of bias and systemic limitations in the methods
themselves. Finally, Part V concludes by identifying future policy
measures to effectively utilize algorithms in bail reform efforts.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Modern practices of setting bail reached a plateau with the
enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.6 “Bail schedules,” which
standardize monetary amounts of bail “based on the offense
charged, regardless of the characteristics of an individual
4

See
ARNOLD FOUND.,
Judge
Regan
Miller
(June
2015),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/videos/judge-regan-miller/; Jennifer Brookland
& Frank Stasio, Mecklenburg County Takes a New Look at Bail Reform, WUNC
(Dec. 5, 2017), http://wunc.org/post/mecklenburg-county-takes-new-look-bailreform#stream/0.
5
Risk assessment algorithms are tools used to predict future behavior among
incarcerated defendants. In the criminal justice system, these algorithms are
chiefly used to narrowly estimate an individual’s likelihood of committing new
criminal activity and assess risk of flight. See Vignesh Ramachandran, Exploring
the Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, STANFORD ENGINEERING
(May 3, 2017), https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/exploring-usealgorithms-criminal-justice-system.
6
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3148 (2012).
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defendant,”7 have been utilized as the predominant mechanism
governing pretrial detention procedures and have remained
unchallenged for nearly half a century.8 Although these schedules
seem to promote equal treatment of defendants, they have
nonetheless come under attack for failing to effectively satisfy the
aims of pretrial detention outlined in the Bail Reform Act.9 The use
of algorithms as a tool to assess the risk of individual defendants
pending trial has gained support in numerous “pilot” jurisdictions
throughout the country10 and now begs the question of whether
nation-wide adoption is the next logical step in bail reform efforts.
The answer to this question requires reviewing the history of bail
and the shortcomings of the existing system.
A. Brief History and Criticism of Modern Practices for Setting
Bail
Historically, determining an appropriate amount for bail pending
trial has neither been restricted nor monitored.11 Although the Eighth
Amendment’s “prohibition against excessive bail applies to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment,”12 in its early years, the clause
was applied broadly and afforded little judicial oversight as to what
amount was considered “excessive.”13 It was not until the 1950s, in
James A. Allen, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and
Defining the Elusive Meaning of “Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 637, 641
(2017).
8
Id.
9
See id.
10
Initial pilot sites testing the effectiveness of the Arnold Foundation’s risk
assessment tool included: several counties in Arizona; multiple courts in
Colorado; the state of Kentucky; Santa Cruz County, California; and Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina. Press Release, Arnold Found., Laura and John Arnold
Foundation Announces New Pilot Sites for Court Risk Assessment Tool (Feb. 20,
2014), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/home-foundation-areas-focus-resources
-grants-team-jobs-contact-us-laura-john-arnold-foundation-announces-newpilot-sites-court-risk-assessme/.
11
See generally United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326–27 (D.C.
1981) (providing a brief synopsis of the English bail system).
12
NEIL P. COHEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE
PROCESS 104 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2014) (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47
(2008)).
13
See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1326–27.
7
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the landmark case Stack v. Boyle,14 that the Supreme Court held that
defendants have a right to challenge the amount of bail set if the
allocation is significantly higher than the usual amount in
comparable cases.15 This decision promoted the standardization of
bail through the formation of the bail schedule, a judicially created
listing of presumptive bail amounts for certain offenses used in the
majority of jurisdictions, both state and federal, today.16 These
schedules may “formally be promulgated through state law, or
informally employed by local officials.”17 The exact terms of bail
schedules vary in providing maximum and minimum allocations for
each offense.18 In varying jurisdictions, the legislature either
mandates that the stipulated amount be utilized or the amount is
provided as a suggestion to the judicial official while they exercise
their discretion in deciding the actual amount.19 Ultimately, these
bail schedules helped address the concerns of the Stack Court by
reigning in the wide disparity in bail amounts between defendants
with comparable charges, while simultaneously affording judges
some degree of variance within the maximum-minimum band when
setting bail, given the individual circumstances of each case and
defendant.20
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 (“1966 Act”) was the first in a
series of congressional acts aimed at reforming pretrial bail
procedure, which resulted in the release of more defendants pretrial
while creating a “rationale that allowed for increased detention.”21
The 1966 Act sought to continue the trend of individualized
discretion set forth in Stack, requiring judicial officers to review
defendants’ conditions of release after defendants are held in
custody for a twenty-four hour period.22 While in some respects
14

342 U.S. 1 (1951).
Id. at 4.
16
See Allen, supra note 7.
17
Id. at 641 (quoting Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial
Discretion?, 26 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011)).
18
See id.
19
See id. at 642.
20
See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4; Allen, supra note 7, at 642.
21
Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST.
L.J. 723, 740–41 (2011).
22
See Wayne C. Holcombe, Bail, 73 GEO. L.J. 466, 473 (1984).
15
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promoting individual review, the 1966 Act also allowed for the
continued pretrial detention of defendants who were unable to
satisfy the imposed conditions, so long as that detention did “not
amount to punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution.”23
However, the looming question of what constituted “punishment” in
the context of pretrial detention remained unanswered in the decades
following the reform legislation.24
The most recent major federal reform effort for proceduredriven pretrial detention came with the passage of the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”).25 The 1984 Act made several key changes
to the practice of setting bail post-Stack and the 1966 Act, including:
prohibitions on the practice of imposing absurdly high bail amounts
in an effort to detain defendants,26 formally authorizing courts to
consider the danger a defendant may pose to the community or to
specific individuals,27 and providing hearings to defendants as a
requirement of pretrial detention.28 The 1984 Act is designed to
reasonably ensure a defendant will appear in court and will not
“endanger the safety of any other person or the community” pending
trial.29 Opponents of the 1984 Act viewed its provisions of statutorily
authorizing the detention of an individual presumed innocent as a
violation of a defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.30 This element of the 1984 Act was quickly challenged
in United States v. Salerno31 as being facially unconstitutional.32
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that pretrial
detention may serve as “a potential solution to a pressing societal

23

Id. at 473–74.
See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (holding a New York
statute authorizing the detention of juveniles who posed a “serious risk” to the
community was compatible with due process under the “fundamental fairness”
test and was not in fact punitive).
25
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3148 (2012).
26
See id. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
27
See id. § 3142(c)(1).
28
See id. § 3142(e)(1).
29
Id. § 3142(b).
30
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744–45 (1987).
31
Id. at 739.
32
Id. at 741.
24
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problem,”33 permitting the Government to detain an arrestee pending
trial if it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that no
release conditions would reasonably assure public safety.34
Since Salerno, the “potential solution” endorsed by the Court
has resulted in numerous forms of release, pending trial.35 A
defendant may be released from pretrial custody by posting a full
cash bond, by being granted an unsecured bond or conditional
release, or by the most “traditional” form of bail—through a surety
bond backed by a professional bond company.36 In cases involving
release through a surety bond, the bail bonding company “signs a
promissory note to the court for the full bail amount and then
charges the defendant a percentage of that full amount as a fee.”37 A
professional bond company charges defendants a non-refundable
fee (ordinarily ten percent of the total bond set by the court) to secure
their release pending trial.38 If a defendant fails to appear for their
court date, the bond is revoked, and the “bounty hunters” are used
to recapture the absconding offender.39 This aspect of the modern
bail system is the subject of a high degree of criticism from both
scholars and judicial officials.40 The privatization of pretrial release
and financial incentives for recapture create a “system [which]
discriminates as bail bondsmen remain part of the political process,
with interests antithetical to those of the accused.”41 The system is
further compromised as often defendants’ only option for release
pending trial is to turn to a bail bonding company. Defendants who
33

Id. at 747.
Id. at 752.
35
See COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 105–09.
36
A full cash or surety bond requires the defendant to pay the Court the full
amount in cash before being released from custody. An unsecured bond allows
for immediate release upon the defendant’s promise to pay the set amount in full
in the event they fail to appear for their next court date. Conditional release occurs
when a judicial official stipulates restrictions on the defendant’s release (such as
no contact orders or restrictions on travel), on which violation of these conditions
results in revocation of bail and re-arrest. Id.
37
Id. at 106.
38
See id.
39
See id. at 107.
40
See Lydia D. Johnson, The Politics of the Bail System: What’s the Price for
Freedom?, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 171, 186 (2015).
41
Id.
34
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are unable to satisfy their bond conditions remain in custody with
significant costs to the court system and community alike. These
resulting consequences include a rise in recidivism, correlating to
the length of a defendant’s incarceration (with as high as a 51%
greater likelihood of reoffending),42 higher jail populations
increasing costs to taxpayers in the community,43 and a flooded court
system hampering efforts to maintain an efficient judiciary.44 These
criticisms of the current system have led many jurisdictions45 to seek
more beneficial alternatives to the traditional offense-driven bail
schedule for the benefit of all actors involved, except for bail
bonding companies. Algorithms have emerged as one of these
alternatives, providing a reliable tool for thoroughly analyzing a
defendant’s risk of flight and danger to the community, and
supporting a more efficient, equitable bail determination procedure
in the process.
B. Rethinking Risk Assessment Factors Through the Use of
Algorithms
“One of the most striking innovations in the criminal justice
system during the past thirty years has been the introduction of
Low-risk defendants remaining in custody for two to three days are “almost
40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent
defendants held no more than 24 hours.” This recidivism rate climbs to 51 percent
when a defendant is held for eight to fourteen days. DR. CHRISTOPHER T.
LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3 (2013),
https://www.pretrial.org/download/research/The%20Hidden%20Costs%20of%2
0Pretrial%20Detention%20-%20LJAF%202013.pdf.
43
See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4 (noting Mecklenburg County’s cost of
$166 to hold defendants in custody, resulting in $113 million spent on inmate
housing in 2014).
44
See Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the
Conventional Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REV. 761, 761 (1996).
45
The most prominent of these jurisdictions include the entire states of Arizona,
Kentucky, and New Jersey—in addition to some of the country’s largest
metropolitan areas including Chicago, Illinois, and Charlotte, North Carolina.
Press Release, Arnold Found., More Than 20 Cities and States Adopt Risk
Assessment Tool to Help Judges Decide Which Defendants to Detain Prior to
Trial (Jun. 26, 2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/more-than-20-cities-andstates-adopt-risk-assessment-tool-to-help-judges-decide-which-defendants-todetain-prior-to-trial/.
42
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actuarial methods—statistical models and software programs—
designed to help judges and prosecutors assess the risk of criminal
offenders.”46 These algorithms rely on a set order of operations
similar to a mathematical equation.47 These computer-generated
formula-based methods have been employed to a limited degree in
four main areas of the criminal justice system, including: “pretrial
and bail, sentencing, probation and parole, and juvenile justice.”48
A policy paper adopted by the Conference of State Court
Administrators likened risk assessment algorithms to the statistical
analysis utilized by Oakland A’s general manager Billy Beane, as
depicted in Michael Lewis’s book, Moneyball.49 Beane’s
algorithmic approach was discounted by the greater baseball
community for failing to abide by “long-held practices based on
intuition and gut-feelings, tradition, and ideology.”50 Similarly,
opponents of risk assessment algorithms remain skeptical of its
long-term effectiveness, instead clinging to traditional methods of
determining pretrial release.51 However, just as Beane’s new method
turned out to be a more accurate predictor of baseball talent,
algorithms allow for a more accurate assessment of a defendant’s
flight risk and danger to the community to be ascertained in the bail
determination process, despite their departure from the traditional
practice of following a bail schedule.
Further, the similar application of algorithms used for what some
jurisdictions have deemed “predictive policing” has recently been
subject to a high degree of scrutiny due to its implications on Fourth
46
DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS, COURTS AND PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS 1 (2015),
http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/Summary_Courts_and_Data.pdf.
47
See Jason Tashea, Risk-Assessment Algorithms Challenged in Bail, Sentencing
and Parole Decisions, ABA J. (Mar. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine
/article/algorithm_bail_sentencing_parole.
48
DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 46.
49
ARTHUR W. PEPIN, 2012-2013 POLICY PAPER: EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL
RELEASE 5 (2012), https://www.pretrial.org/download/policy-statements/Evidence
%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20-%20COSCA%202012.pdf.
50
Id.
51
See J. Mark W. Klingensmith, Computers Laying Down the Law: Will Judges
Become Obsolete?, 90 FLA. B.J. 80, 81–82 (Jan. 2016), https://www.floridabar.org
/news/tfb-journal/?durl=/DIVCOM/JN/jnjournal01.nsf/Articles/B31E0BE4DA969
63485257F29005A0048.
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Amendment issues related to reasonable suspicion.52 “Promoted as
the next smart policing weapon in the war on crime,” proponents
claim these algorithms will “predict crime before it happens.”53
Evaluated in this context, “[p]redictive algorithms are not magic
boxes that divine future crime, but instead probability models of
future events based on current environmental vulnerabilities.”54
Critics believe the new technology55 could lead to a society
analogous to the police state illustrated in the movie Minority
Report.56 More legalistic concerns arise when examining the
algorithm’s effect on an individual’s protections and liberties
granted by the Fourth Amendment.57 Despite concerns arising from
the use of algorithms in the policing process, their value as a
supplemental tool to analyze a defendant’s risk of flight and danger
to the community should not be underestimated.
In the last few years, numerous jurisdictions have begun
implementing some form of risk assessment algorithm into their bail
determination procedures on a trial basis, including the entire states
of Kentucky, New Jersey, and Arizona, as well as the District of
52
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable
Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 285–86 (2012) (noting the impact of predictive
algorithms on constitutional protections relating to searches, seizures, and
arrests).
53
“[P]redictive policing uses the power of ‘big data’ to isolate patterns in
otherwise random acts.” By using information gathered from specific occurrences
such as arrests and incident reports, cross-referenced with other variables such as
the addresses of known gang members, past calls for service to law enforcement,
and areas of frequent violent activity. Id. at 261, 265–66.
54
Id. at 314.
55
See Shibani Mahtani, Chicago Police Take a Page from “Minority Report”,
WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chicagopolice-take-a-page-from-minority-report-1494581400.
56
Minority Report is a neo-noir science-fiction movie directed by Steven
Spielberg and starring Tom Cruise, in which crime is eradicated due to the
“Precrime” police unit’s ability to predict crimes before they occur. MINORITY
REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).
57
See Katherine Freeman, Recent Development, Algorithmic Injustice: How
the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to Protect Due Process Rights in State v.
Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 75, 92 (2016) (citing due process concerns
stemming from a defendant’s inability to “refute, supplement, and explain” the
algorithm’s formula at sentencing and the lack of individualized sentencing in the
process).
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Columbia; Cook County, Illinois; Santa Cruz County, California;
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; Harris County, Texas; and
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.58 Kentucky, in particular, has
been viewed as a national model in pretrial procedure,59 remaining
at the forefront with its adoption of algorithmic approaches to bail.
Many other jurisdictions, such as Mecklenburg County, have sought
reform measures in an effort to address unresolved issues in their
respective systems, such as jail overcrowding and the prospective
costs of new housing facilities.60 Additionally, New York City has
adopted the use of algorithms in multiple areas of its criminal justice
system.61 City officials recently passed a bill to test its formulaic
system for bias and to develop a process for citizens to request
explanations of algorithmic decisions when they are dissatisfied
with particular outcomes.62 This “open source” bill is believed to be
58

As of 2017, Kentucky, Arizona, and New Jersey were the only states to have
implemented the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment statewide.
PRETRIAL JUST. INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING 4 (July
2017), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NCJA/c3320104-776e4e0e-b687-4ffa1fd54e8c/UploadedImages/National%20Forum/2017%20Forum
/fanno-burdeen-where-pretrial-improvements-2017.pdf.
59
See ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS FROM THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC
SAFETY ASSESSMENT – COURT IN KENTUCKY 2 (July 2014),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-CourtKentucky-6-Month-Report.pdf (noting Kentucky’s past as an early adopter and
innovative leader in pretrial reform efforts).
60
See
Safety
and
Justice
Challenge,
MECKNC.GOV.,
https://www.mecknc.gov/CriminalJusticeServices/Pages/SJC.aspx (last visited
Mar. 26, 2018); see also Keith Humphreys, Why America’s Jails Are So
Overcrowded, N.Y. POST (Apr. 26, 2017, 5:02 AM), https://nypost.com/2017/04
/26/why-americas-jails-are-so-overcrowded/. Due to its high population, jail
overcrowding has been a continuing problem in Mecklenburg County for well
over a decade. See Chris Fitzsimon, Jail Overcrowding Critical, Sheriff Says, N.C.
POL’Y WATCH (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2006/09/05/jailovercrowding-critical-sheriff-says/.
61
See Roshan Abraham, New York City Passes Bill to Study Biases in
Algorithms Used by the City, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 19, 2017, 9:52 AM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xw4xdw/new-york-city-algorithmicbias-bill-law.
62
An earlier version of the bill required “all agencies that perform algorithmic
decision-making—from policing to public school assignments—make their code
publicly available.” Id. at 61. Its final version requires a task force to develop a
procedure which detects algorithmic bias to “determine whether an agency
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one of the first of its kind and has been commended for its accessible
ingenuity.63
However, not everyone is convinced that algorithmic procedure
is the way of the future. As of 2015, fewer than ten percent of all
jurisdictions had used a method of formal risk assessment when
setting bail.64 Anne Milgram, former attorney general of New Jersey,
explains that “[s]uch assessments are costly to conduct and are
sometimes discounted by judges because they depend on
information reported by defendants.”65 Other critics believe
algorithms threaten the idea that people want judges who use their
“life experience, common sense, and ethics” to guide their decision
making rather than relying on a formula.66 Concerns over bias and
discrimination have erupted with the implementation of algorithmic
decision-making in other parts of the criminal justice process,
namely at the sentencing stage.67 In light of these apprehensions
toward the adoption of formulaic methodology to aid decisionmaking in the criminal justice system, the duty of proving the
effectiveness of reform efforts falls to those jurisdictions that have
already implemented algorithmic risk assessment into their bail
determination process.
automated decision system disproportionately impacts persons [on an
impermissible basis] . . . .” Id.
63
See id.
64
See Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-thegranting-of-bail-into-a-science.html.
65
Id. While the research and testing required to formulate such algorithms is
extensive, tools such as the PSA can be implemented with minimal expense and
even reduce costs in the long run by not requiring additional staff to conduct
individual defendant interviews and enhancing judicial efficiency. ARNOLD
FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 4
(2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAFresearch-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf.
66
See Klingensmith, supra note 51 (believing these algorithms to be
compulsory, rather than a tool to supplement the common sense and experience
of judicial officials).
67
See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016); Criminal Law –
Sentencing Guidelines – Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before Use
of Algorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing – State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749
(Wis. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 1530 (2017); Freeman, supra note 57.
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III. THE PSA AND MECKLENBURG COUNTY
There has been a noticeable shift in approaches to bail procedure
over the last decade, with many courts moving away from systems
driven by rigid, offense-focused bail schedules in favor of “rigorous,
scientific, data-driven risk assessments.”68 Among the jurisdictions
at the forefront of utilizing risk assessment factors in its bail
determination procedures is Mecklenburg County, the most
populous county in North Carolina and home to the city of Charlotte.
Due to its large population, Mecklenburg County demands a high
degree of efficiency from its court system to ease the burden of
overcrowded dockets and to ensure the fair and reasonable
administration of justice.69 To achieve this goal, Mecklenburg
County became one of the first jurisdictions in the country—and to
date, the only jurisdiction in North Carolina—to adopt the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool
(hereinafter referred to as the PSA).70 Since implementing the PSA,
both defendants and the community of Mecklenburg County have
experienced immensely positive results, demonstrating the benefits
of algorithmic risk assessment in comparison to heavy reliance on
traditional bail schedules corresponding to monetary constraints.71
A. The PSA’s Approach to Bail Reform
The Laura and John Arnold Foundation is a philanthropic
organization with a mission to “improve the lives of individuals by
strengthening our social, governmental, and economic systems.”72
Arnold Foundation researchers compiled 1.5 million criminal cases

68

Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness,
2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 867 (2016) (citation omitted).
69
See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4.
70
ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 10.
71
See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4; Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4
(discussing the decrease in jail population, increased efficiency of the court
system, and extrinsic benefits to the community resulting from the PSA-Court’s
utilization in Mecklenburg County).
72
About LJAF, ARNOLD FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 26, 2018).
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gathered from approximately 300 different U.S. jurisdictions.73
From these cases, the Foundation’s research team studied 746,525
cases of defendants who had been released pretrial before their
disposition.74 The initial analysis examined hundreds of factors
including prior instances of failure to appear for court, drug and
alcohol use, mental health, family relations, residency status, and
employment history, among others.75 Researchers found that a small
number of factors obtained at the administrative level could
accurately predict a defendant’s risk level.76 Additionally, inclusion
of factors relating to a defendant’s personal background gathered at
an in-person interview with pretrial services resulted in no positive
effect on the algorithm’s performance.77 Removing these factors
from consideration created a methodical tool, derived from readily
accessible administrative factors, that eliminated the need for costly,
time-consuming pretrial interviews whose variables often
inadvertently contribute to formulaic bias.78 The resulting algorithm
produced two scores in line with those produced by the traditional
factors courts use to evaluate pretrial detention, one predicting the
defendant’s risk of flight and the other assessing the danger they
pose to the community if released pending trial.79
The PSA quantitates values for flight risk and safety of the
community through the use of three separate risk assessment scales
ranging from a low of one to a high of six.80 The first two scales
represent “dangerousness predictions,” broken down into “new
criminal activity” and “new violent criminal activity,”
respectively.81 The third scale predicts the risk of a defendant’s
73

Public Safety Assessment, ARNOLD FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org
/initiative/criminal-justice/crime-prevention/public-safety-assessment/ (last visited
Mar. 26, 2018).
74
ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 65, at 3.
75
Id. at 3–4.
76
These administrative factors determined when the defendant is processed,
mainly relating to information available from their criminal background history.
Id.
77
See id. at 4.
78
See id.
79
See Gouldin, supra note 68, at 869.
80
See id. at 870.
81
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“failure to appear.”82 The values assigned to each of these three
scales are derived from a series of nine factors: whether the charged
offense is violent, other pending charges, prior misdemeanor
convictions, prior felony convictions, prior violent convictions,
prior failure to appear pretrial within the last two years, prior failure
to appear pretrial outside the last two years, prior convictions
resulting in incarceration, and age at the time of arrest. 83 None of
these nine factors require individual defendant interviews as all are
determined through administrative information capable of being
automatically compiled prior to an initial bail hearing.84 The PSA’s
creators claim the algorithm is “more objective, far less expensive,
and requires fewer resources to administer than previous
techniques.”85 Professor Lauryn Gouldin, former Assistant Director
of the Center for Research in Crime and Justice at New York
University School of Law, has praised the algorithm, stating “[t]oo
many of the federal and state risk assessment tools merge the
analysis of flight risk and dangerousness into a single risk
assessment calculation, the PSA-Court risk assessment tool being a
notable exception.”86
The Arnold Foundation also took steps to minimize algorithmic
bias in the PSA risk assessment tool.87 Unlike many of the factors at
issue with predictive policing algorithms,88 the PSA tool excludes
variables involving race, gender, income, education, home address,
history of drug use, family status, marital status, national origin,
employment, or religion.89 Additionally, the Arnold Foundation
stresses that the PSA analysis is not the only information a judge
should consider when determining bail.90 The PSA is merely one of
82

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
ARNOLD FOUND., THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT (PSA) 1 (2016),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Infographic.pdf.
84
See Gouldin, supra note 68, at 870.
85
Id. (quoting ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83).
86
Id. at 870–71.
87
See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83 (“The PSA provides information that is
race- and gender- neutral. It helps . . . enhance fairness and efficiency in the
system.”).
88
See Ferguson, supra note 52, at 265.
89
See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83.
90
See id.
83

236

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 19: 221

several tools at a judge’s disposal to guide their decision-making
process, with the goal of “increas[ing] safety, reduc[ing] taxpayer
costs, and enhanc[ing] fairness and efficiency in the system.”91
The PSA’s effectiveness as a risk assessment tool is best
illustrated by comparing its outcomes to those produced by a
traditional bail schedule. In North Carolina, it is statutorily required
that the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge for each judicial
district publish established bail policies to guide pretrial release.92
During the transition in which the PSA was first implemented in
Mecklenburg County, the Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial
District93 was revised to reflect the new methodology. The PSA
matrix is specifically included in the policy,94 noting recommended
action by taking both the flight risk of the defendant and the danger
they pose to the community into consideration.95 The policy’s
recommended bail schedule most acutely represents these changes
when compared to other jurisdictions’ schedules within the state.
For example, suppose a young man with limited prior
convictions is caught with a needle and heroin. The young man is
then charged with possession of a Schedule I controlled substance,96
a Class I felony in North Carolina.97 Under Mecklenburg’s policy,
the schedule recommends bail ranging from $0 to $25,000,98 more
narrowly tailored after performing a PSA risk analysis. Because the
defendant presents no danger to the community and limited risk of
flight, he would likely be released on an unsecured bond or its
equivalent pending trial, while also being afforded the opportunity

91

Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-535(a) (2016).
93
Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, 14-R
1615, 1 (2014), https://www.mecknc.gov/CriminalJusticeServices/Documents
/Mecklenburg%20County%20Bail%20Policy.pdf
(outlining
Mecklenburg
County’s recommended monetary amounts and factors to be considered when
determining conditions of release).
94
See id. at 22, Exhibit C.
95
Id. at 1.
96
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-89(a)(j) (2016).
97
Id. § 90-95(d)(1).
98
Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, supra
note 93, at 16.
92
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to enroll in a drug rehabilitation program.99 This outcome changes
dramatically when an individual under the same circumstances is
charged with possession in a jurisdiction that has not adopted
algorithmic risk assessment, such as Wake County, North Carolina.
Under Wake County’s bail policy,100 it is recommended that the
same defendant charged with a Class I felony be allocated a $2,000
to $10,000 secured bond as a condition of release.101 While the
policy stipulates that these amounts are general guidelines for
release,102 based upon the limited facts available at the initial bail
determination hearing and a quick glance of the file only revealing
“Possession of a Schedule I Controlled Substance,” this could easily
lead a judicial official to impose the $2,000 recommended
minimum. If this defendant cannot afford to pay a bail bonding
company $200 for release,103 they will remain in custody pending
trial, keeping them from receiving the drug treatment they need out
of custody, all while the community pays to house them in an
already overcrowded jail system.104 The above example
demonstrates the equitable impact an algorithm-based risk
assessment tool may have over jurisdictions relying on traditional
bail schedules and determination methods.
However, despite the new implementations, conventional
factors for determining release have not been completely eradicated
from consideration under the Mecklenburg bail policy. In contrast
to the risk assessment values used by the PSA, the bail policy
maintains traditional variables for analyzing flight risk and
community safety, which a judicial official must evaluate when
99

Depending on the extent of the defendant’s prior convictions, he would likely
be considered for conditional discharge under North Carolina’s drug education
program if he qualifies. The North Carolina Drug Education School Program,
N.C. DRUG EDUC. SCH., https://ncdes.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
100
Administrative Order Setting Tenth Judicial District Pretrial Release
Policies 1 (2013), http://www.ncids.org/racebank/Pretrial/Administrative
%20Order%20Setting%2010th%20Judicial%20District%20Pretrial%20Release
%20Policies.pdf.
101
Id. at 6.
102
Id. at 5.
103
The cost of a bondsman charging an ordinary fee of ten percent for bail of
$2000 would be $200. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 106.
104
See Fitzsimon, supra note 60.
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setting the terms for pretrial release.105 Many of the considered
factors, such as subsection (C) of the Bail Policy for the TwentySixth Judicial District, which regards “[t]he defendant’s family ties,
employment, financial resources, character, and mental
condition,”106 appear to undermine the solely administrative
variables utilized by the PSA tool, functioning as proxies for the
very race and gender bias the algorithmic approach seeks to
eliminate.107 Nonetheless, while maintaining these factors may not
appear ideal, their inclusion preserves the independent discretion of
the judiciary while reinforcing the fact that the PSA is not a binding
instrument but rather a resource to be used to form an appropriate
and equitable assessment for conditions of release pending trial. The
positive results Mecklenburg County has experienced from
implementing the PSA speak to the powerful role algorithmic risk
assessment tools may serve in bail reform efforts moving forward.
B. Implementation in Mecklenburg County and Positive Outcomes
Government officials in Mecklenburg County were faced with
the prospect of reforming its bail system well over a decade before
the PSA came into existence.108 From 1990 to 2008, Charlotte’s
population grew at a rate of 70%, while the county’s jail population
increased by 179%.109 The number of detained individuals led to a
problem of jail overcrowding that existing housing facilities could
not maintain long-term.110 This left the county with two options—
construct new jail housing facilities to account for the increased
detention rate, at an immense cost to the community,111 or implement

105

See Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District,
supra note 93, at 2.
106
Id.
107
See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83.
108
See KIMME & ASSOCS., INC. ET AL., MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NC
DETENTION-CORRECTIONS MASTER PLAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2008),
https://www.charmeck.org/mecklenburg/county/countymanagersoffice/omb/capi
talprojects/documents/shf-exec%20sum%20meck%202008.pdf.
109
Id. at 1.
110
Id. at 1–2.
111
The estimated construction and additional operating costs to meet baseline
needs were broken down into three projections, totaling annual cost increases of
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a series of policy measures to reduce the detention rate to a
manageable level, including a revision of bail setting and pretrial
release methodology.112 While attempts at reform were
implemented, jail overcrowding remained a continuing problem in
Mecklenburg County until the PSA was adopted in 2014.113
Perhaps the most insightful source for assessing the
effectiveness of the PSA and application of algorithmic bail
procedures in Mecklenburg County is the group of judicial officials
responsible for determining pretrial release. In June 2015, the
Arnold Foundation interviewed Chief District Court Judge Regan
Miller on his opinion of the PSA and its usefulness.114 Judge Miller
began by questioning the fairness of the idea that “everybody
charged with a certain crime was going to be initially started at a
monetary bond at a certain amount” and the inequities experienced
by defendants of limited means.115 Judge Miller continued by noting
the negative effects experienced by defendants detained for more
than two days, namely losing their jobs and members of their family
and the community believing they are already guilty of the charges
against them.116 Judge Miller commended the PSA for the
information it provides, its objective fairness, and its function as a
safeguard from judges being governed by their own implicit bias.117
More recently, in a radio interview from December 2017,
District Court Judge Elizabeth Trosch further emphasized the PSA’s
benefits to both the defendants and the greater community.118 Judge
Trosch articulated that in many local jails, while half of the
defendants in custody have a low flight risk and are not a danger to
the community, they remain detained “because they are unable to
pay a money bond in order to secure their release.”119 This prevents
$38.6 million, $72.8 million, and $141.7 million through the years 2012, 2020,
and 2030 respectively. Id. at 4.
112
See id. at 5–8.
113
See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4; ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 10.
114
ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4.
119
Id.
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these defendants from “go[ing] back to work and their families
while their case is being processed in the court system.”120 A risk
assessment tool such as the PSA provides a more targeted
assessment of these factors tailored to the individual, rather than a
more rigid, offense-driven system such as a traditional bail schedule,
allowing judicial officials to reach a more efficient and equitable
bail determination. In 2014, Mecklenburg County spent $113
million on inmate housing, roughly $166 per day per defendant—an
amount Judge Trosch criticizes as “a lot of money to jail people who
do not pose a serious threat to public safety.”121 According to Judge
Trosch, by using the PSA for the past five years, Mecklenburg
County has been able to safely reduce its jail population by
approximately forty percent.122 The far-reaching benefits of the PSA
are not just acknowledged by the judiciary but by other actors in the
criminal justice system as well.123
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike support the
effectiveness of the PSA.124 Former Mecklenburg County District
Attorney Andrew Murray125 noted, “the risk assessment has allowed
us to lower the number of the jail population [while] continu[ing] to
lower the crime rate here in Mecklenburg County.”126 Like his
colleagues on the bench, Mr. Murray observed the PSA offers value
by promoting consistency amongst judges and by providing
“something that is data-driven, that is not subjective.”127 Mr. Murray
emphasized many of the same beneficial effects the tool has had on
the system referenced by the county’s judicial officials such as tax
savings to the community and the lack of the adverse consequences

120

Id.
Id.
122
Id.; see also ARNOLD FOUND., District Attorney Andrew Murray (June
2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/videos/district-attorney-andrew-murray/
(supporting the specific claim that the reduction has maintained safety).
123
See Dewan, supra note 64.
124
See id.; ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 122.
125
Andrew Murray is currently the United States Attorney for the Western
District of North Carolina. Meet the U.S. Attorney, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdnc/meet-us-attorney (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
126
ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 122.
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pretrial confinement imposes on defendants.128 Similarly,
Mecklenburg County Public Defender Kevin Tully supports the
PSA’s function in furthering bail reform efforts, believing the tool
is not only useful for judicial officials but also benefits his attorneys
on staff, allowing them to more effectively advocate on behalf of
their indigent clients.129 Overall, the PSA has had a meaningful,
lasting impact on Mecklenburg County’s bail procedure and has led
to beneficial outcomes in every corner of the criminal justice
system.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR AN ALGORITHMIC APPROACH TO BAIL
REFORM
As of August 2017, the use of the PSA had expanded from its
initial pilot sites and had been adopted in over two dozen
jurisdictions throughout the United States.130 The Arnold Foundation
expressed a goal in 2013 “that every judge in America will use a
data-driven, objective risk assessment within the next five years.”131
Now, five years later, one must wonder why the majority of
jurisdictions, including North Carolina’s other ninety-nine counties,
have resisted change and remain entrenched in an archaic system of
bail schedules rooted in monetary constraints.
A. Benefits to Defendants, the Criminal Justice System, and the
Community
The benefits of an algorithmic bail system become apparent
when examining the effects the PSA has had in Mecklenburg
County.132 Traditional bail schedules impose financial limitations
that often prevent an individual from obtaining release before trial.133
128

See Dewan, supra note 64.
See ARNOLD FOUND., Public Defender Kevin Tully (June 2015),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/videos/public-defender-kevin-tully/.
130
Additionally, some form of risk assessment algorithm is used in the bail
determination procedures in more than twenty states. Jon Schuppe, Post Bail,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform.
131
ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 65, at 5.
132
Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4 (emphasizing the positive effects
experienced by both defendants and the community with the increased release of
low risk individuals pending trial).
133
See Allen, supra note 7.
129
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Many indigent defendants who pose neither a danger to public safety
nor risk of flight nonetheless remain in custody, unable to turn to
even a private bail bonding company for release.134 Algorithmic
techniques benefit these individuals, who would otherwise be
ineligible for release under a uniform, offense-focused bail
schedule. Less time in custody translates to lower recidivism rates,135
likely because individual defendants spend less time behind bars
exposed to more severe offenders.136 Additionally, defendants that
spend less time behind bars can retain their jobs on release.137
Unemployment resulting from failure to report for work, or in
response to notifying management of incarceration, makes
individuals prone to reoffending as a result of financial necessity. 138
Using algorithmic tools to emphasize the low risk a defendant poses
to the community allows individuals who would otherwise remain
detained under a traditional bail schedule to keep their jobs and care
for their children while they await trial.
In addition to tangible benefits for defendants released pretrial,
an algorithmic system promotes non-discriminatory procedural
tools, ensuring constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due
process remain intact. In ODonnell v. Harris County,139 a federal
district court granted a preliminary injunction barring the detention
of indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors who remained
in custody solely because of their inability to pay. 140 In evaluating
the county’s risk assessment tool, the court emphasized the issue by
requiring an intermediate standard of “careful review,”141 as opposed
134

See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4.
See LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 42.
136
See id.
137
See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4.
138
See id.
139
ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
140
See id. at 1059. On the facts of the case, the federal district court concluded
more than 100 individuals were detained in the Harris County Jail, who although
were judicially found eligible for release, were prevented from doing so solely on
the basis of their indigency. Id. at 1116.
141
The opinion cites to the Supreme Court’s definition of “careful review” for
wealth-based classifications, “requir[ing] a careful inquiry into such factors as
‘the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the
rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the
135
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to a rational basis standard, which is typically required for wealthbased classifications because of the individual liberty threatened by
detention.142 The Fifth Circuit recently upheld the district court’s
application of intermediate scrutiny, holding that, while “neither
prisoners nor indigents constitute a suspect class . . . heightened
scrutiny is required when criminal laws detain poor
defendants because of their indigence.”143 The court’s heightened
review of the county’s risk assessment practices demonstrates the
importance of algorithmic bail procedures functioning as a tool to
protect the accused’s right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Judicial efficiency is more important than ever given the
continually stifled resources of the criminal justice system. 144 The
scope of efficiency created by algorithmic bail procedures is not
limited to that experienced by judicial officials as a result of lower
docket sizes145 but also allows prosecutors to more effectively
manage caseloads,146 attorneys to more fervently advocate on behalf
of their clients,147 and jail personnel to more easily monitor
defendants while the case is pending.148 Having fewer defendants in
custody significantly reduces safety concerns due to overcrowded
jail populations,149 and also allows less severe cases to be resolved
more productively. This eliminates the need to confine and transport
defendants who have been detained for minor offenses, such as
failure to pay a fine. All of these effects demonstrate the increased
efficiency algorithmic techniques lend to bail procedure and the
management of judicial resources.

existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose.’” Id. at 1137 (citing
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1983)).
142
See id. at 1134.
143
ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 882 F.3d 528, 544 (5th Cir. 2018).
144
See Israel, supra note 44, at 761.
145
See id. at 765.
146
See id. at 763.
147
See id. at 778.
148
See Fitzsimon, supra note 60.
149
See id.
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Moreover, the use of algorithms promotes public confidence in
the justice system.150 Embracing more equitable methods of pretrial
risk assessment backed by proven algorithmic procedure decreases
the largely unchecked power the bail bonding industry has over
defendants,151 reversing the privatization of individuals’ freedom
and liberty and bringing these back into the scope of the public
justice system. The increased fairness created through the use of
these non-discriminatory factors promotes greater public confidence
in the justice system as a result.152 Simultaneously, the safety of the
community benefits by having a system focused on prosecuting
more severe offenders in conjunction with the cost-savings of a
reduced jail population.153 Jurisdictions must ask themselves if it
makes sense to detain an individual for failure to pay a $150 fine
when it costs the public $166 a day to house them.154
B. Cautionary Measures: Accounting for Algorithmic Bias and
Systemic Limitations
Notwithstanding the wide-ranging benefits of an algorithmic
risk assessment system in determining bail, there are also pitfalls
that must be avoided in utilizing the methodology. Removing
personal bias from a mechanical algorithm does not necessarily
make it “color-blind.”155 In 2016, an algorithm used in the Broward
County, Florida, criminal justice system was found to have
“wrongly labelled black people as future criminals nearly twice as
150

For a discussion of how the perception of fairness functions as a central
cornerstone of the criminal process, see Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones of the
Judicial Process, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 20–21 (1993).
151
See COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 106.
152
See Israel, supra note 150.
153
See Israel, supra note 44, at 761 (describing the negative effects of an
“overcrowded, overworked, [and] undermanned” justice system).
154
See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4. This problem is bolstered by recent
legislation making it more difficult for judges to waive court costs and fines for
indigent defendants, resulting in their re-arrest for failure to comply. See Jennifer
Brookland & Frank Stasio, The Unjust Legal System That Penalizes the Poor,
WUNC (Feb. 15, 2018), http://wunc.org/post/unjust-legal-system-penalizespoor#stream/0.
155
Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the
Potential of Big Data in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 947, 970 (2016).
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often as whites.”156 Race need not be explicitly written into an
algorithm’s code to produce discriminatory and disproportionate
results. Bias may result from pretrial release factors serving as
proxies for other criteria such as poverty, as seen in examples
including “whether a defendant has a working telephone, whether
they live with a parent or spouse, and whether they’re employed in
a training program.”157
The threat of proxy variables has spurred concerns of
algorithmic bias in other areas of the law as well.158 One such
example is found between using discriminatory proxy variables in
bail algorithms and the unlawful housing practice of redlining. 159
From the 1930s through the 1960s, the U.S. Federal Housing
Administration manipulated risk factor formulas to methodically
exclude minority groups from obtaining loans in certain
communities.160 Even creditworthy minority applicants were
systematically denied their applications under the facially neutral
policy simply because they resided in low-income areas.161 The
inequitable practice was outlawed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
but its chilling aftermath continues to manifest itself in large urban
areas to this day.162 If not properly implemented, algorithms used in
156

Of Prediction and Policy, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 20, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21705329governments-have-much-gain-applying-algorithms-public-policy.
157
Abraham, supra note 61.
158
See Jordan Pearson, AI Could Resurrect a Racist Housing Policy,
MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 2, 2017, 10:23 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us
/article/4x44dp/ai-could-resurrect-a-racist-housing-policy. Other legal areas
concerned with algorithmic bias include employment law, see, e.g., Munoz v. Orr,
200 F.3d 291, 305 (5th Cir. 2000) (containing a claim of discriminatory variables
in the United States Air Force’s Promotions and Placement Referral System), and
university admissions formulas, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
159
See SAM CORBETT-DAVIES ET AL., ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING AND
THE COST OF FAIRNESS 8 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.08230.pdf.
160
These formulas demonstrate the ability of an algorithm to be manipulated
through the inclusion of “course data,” described as “digital noise [added] to the
input data of the favoured group,” skewing results in their favor. Pearson, supra
note 158.
161
See CORBETT-DAVIES ET AL., supra note 159.
162
See Emily Badger, Redlining: Still a Thing, WASH. POST (May 28, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/28/evidence-that-
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the criminal justice context are just as vulnerable to the biased
processes found in redlining.163 An inherent tension results in which
efforts to minimize violent crime must be balanced with fair and
equitable procedure.164 Risk assessment tools, such as the PSA,
demonstrate that a “single-threshold rule” focused purely on
administrative variables (as opposed to “race-specific thresholds”)165
can maximize public safety while simultaneously satisfying core
constitutional principles of fairness in the judicial process.
Potential bias in algorithmic methods can indeed be limited.
“Machines are trained to find patterns that predict future criminality
from past data. They can therefore be told to find patterns that both
predict criminality and avoid disproportionate false categorisation
of . . . future offenders.”166 The true benefit of algorithms lies in the
fact that “predictive software will only base its results on the formal
factors that are coded into its system,” avoiding unconscious,
implicit human bias in its decision-making capabilities.167 Proven
algorithmic assessments like the PSA have been extensively tested168
to ensure a process of decision-making free from biased outcomes
not meant to be “tweaked” by jurisdictions choosing to adopt
them.169 Ensuring the software itself is free from biased proxies is
crucial to the effective implementation of risk assessment
algorithms in the criminal justice system.
Opponents claim algorithms impose limits on the open nature of
the judicial process, pointing to the secrecy shrouding the
proprietary makeup of certain formulas, particularly those used in
the sentencing process.170 While this logic may apply to certain
banks-still-deny-black-borrowers-just-as-they-did-50-years-ago/?utm_term
=.8d464981152c.
163
See CORBETT-DAVIES ET AL., supra note 159 (illustrating a parallel between
redlining practices and the COMPAS sentencing algorithm).
164
See id.
165
Id.
166
Of Prediction and Policy, supra note 156.
167
Simmons, supra note 155, at 979.
168
See supra Part III.
169
See Dewan, supra note 64.
170
See Danielle Citron, (Un)Fairness of Risk Scores Used in Criminal
Sentencing, FORBES (July 13, 2016, 3:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/daniellecitron/2016/07/13/unfairness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/
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portions of the judicial process, it is important not to rule out the use
of risk assessments from every area. Some algorithms used in the
sentencing phase have left defendants unable to examine the factors
determining their fate, garnering due process and equal protection
concerns from courts and scholars alike.171 However, in other
contexts, such as predictive policing, concealing the variables
comprising an algorithm may be necessary to prevent savvy
criminals from working around its safeguard strategy. The use of
algorithms in the context of bail procedure is separate and distinct
from each of the above concerns. Unlike sentencing algorithms, bail
algorithms such as the PSA are designed to be shared publicly and
seek to offer universal application to the widest range of
jurisdictions possible.172 While the adoption of these risk assessment
tools is ultimately implemented by the legislature, their formulation
by private research organizations dedicated to improving equity in
the criminal justice system, in conjunction with police, judicial
officials, and in some cases, the voting public, only furthers the
value of an open, transparent bail reform policy benefiting both
defendants and the community.
Bail algorithms are not yet a wholly perfect solution to resolving
the conflicting principles at stake with pretrial release. In July 2017,
a defendant in San Francisco was charged with the murder of a local
photographer after being released by a judge pretrial for a separate
offense on recommendation of his PSA score.173 Critics quickly
attacked the tool following the tragedy.174 Chris Blaylock, a New
Jersey bail bondsman and opponent of the Arnold Foundation,
claimed the PSA’s “sole purpose is to promote the mass release of
offenders with the least restrictive conditions possible regardless of

(criticizing the COMPAS tool for its lack of transparency surrounding its
sentencing methodology).
171
See id. See generally Freeman, supra note 57 (arguing that courts need to
ensure proper due process protection prior to using algorithms during sentencing).
172
See Schuppe, supra note 130.
173
See Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm Contribute to This San
Francisco Man’s Murder?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 18, 2017, 2:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/18/543976003/did-a-bail-reform-algorithmcontribute-to-this-san-francisco-man-s-murder.
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See id.

248

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 19: 221

the charges.”175 Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Eric Siddall
raised concerns about the difficulty for judges to overturn decisions
“couched in science,” noting fear of being overturned for keeping a
defendant in custody.176 In this instance, the non-profit organization
Pretrial Diversion Project, who compiles the PSA analysis for the
sheriff’s office, admitted to miscalculating the length of this
defendant’s jail time producing an incorrect PSA score.177 Tragedies
such as this emphasize the need to maintain judicial discretion
throughout the criminal process, accentuating that algorithms are
simply another instrument in a judge’s arsenal to determine
appropriate conditions of release pending trial. The overall
effectiveness of algorithms serving as risk assessment tools is
limited by the willingness of judicial officials to take the
recommendations under advisement in conjunction with their own
experience and understanding of the law. The commitment of early
adopters is necessary to prove the effectiveness of risk assessment
tools in practice, only increasing over time as technology develops,
algorithms become increasingly automated, and human error is
removed from the process.
C. Future Steps and Policy Measures in Pursuit of Reform
While avoiding bias in the process of implementing effective
bail algorithms, courts and researchers alike can look to other areas
of the criminal justice system, such as juvenile justice, for the best
approach to putting these new policies into effect. When evaluating
pretrial detention in the juvenile context, courts must consider nonmonetary “community-based supervision strategies” that have
results proven to lower recidivism, allow for more resources devoted
to public safety, and reduce racial disparity in the process. 178
Applying these same strategies to the adult criminal system appears
logical in light of continuing studies revealing adolescent maturity
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of the brain extends well into a child’s mid-twenties,179 particularly
when “young adults aged 18-to-24 constitute 10 percent of the
population but 30 percent of arrests.”180 Critics claim that these
techniques, often centered around rehabilitative goals, are “soft on
crime,” but the resulting effects are just the opposite.181
Rehabilitative approaches have been proven to reduce crime long
term by providing young defendants the help they need and through
individualized treatment and assessments, in addition to keeping a
conviction off of their record that will follow them the rest of their
lives.182 The rationale of these strategies can equally be applied to
the adult criminal system, as rehabilitative pretrial programs outside
of juvenile justice are already in effect in some jurisdictions.183 Much
like algorithmic risk assessments, the pretrial procedures of the
juvenile justice system are grounded in an assessment and strategybased approach most appropriate for the individual defendant. A
traditional bail schedule denoting particular monetary conditions for
enumerated offenses only fosters recidivism among defendants who
cannot afford release, jeopardizing public confidence in the criminal
justice system as a whole.
Jurisdictions throughout the country are beginning to take notice
of the value algorithms offer as tools aiding efforts to maintain the
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balance of cases proceeding efficiently in court and keeping
communities safe. In May 2015, Chief Justice Mark Martin of the
North Carolina Supreme Court formed the North Carolina
Commission on the Administration of Law and Justice, tasked with
evaluating the state’s court system and making recommendations for
reforming the judicial process “within the existing administrative
framework.”184 The Commission’s Final Report, released in March
2017, recommended the statewide adoption of various reform
methods—including the endorsement of the PSA—largely due to
the algorithm’s successful implementation in Mecklenburg
County.185 These reform measures have not been limited to the state
arena but are beginning to take effect at the federal level as well.
Senators Kamala Harris (D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY) have
drafted bipartisan legislation with the central goals of “ensuring that
no-one is detained simply because they are poor, and restoring a
presumption of release for most defendants.”186 The proposed
legislation seeks to achieve these goals through the use of algorithmbased risk assessment tools, such as the PSA, with the Senators
claiming the added benefit of “restor[ing] Americans’ faith in our
justice system.”187
V. CONCLUSION
A leading authority on criminal law and procedure, Professor
Jerold Israel188 has identified a series of nine “cornerstone
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objectives” embodying the “basic structure and the governing legal
principles” of the judicial process.189 Among these cornerstones,
three emerge as encapsulating the values pretrial detention hearings
seek to accomplish: “Respecting the Dignity of the Individual,”
“Maintaining the Appearance of Fairness,” and “Achieving Equality
in the Application of the Process.”190 Risk assessment algorithms
seek to further these three goals by correcting inequities present in
the traditional bail schedule relying on imposed monetary conditions
in order to function as intended. Defendants who neither pose a
danger to the public safety nor risk of flight are identified as such.
They are then released to their families and permitted to return to
their jobs in lieu of remaining in custody at the expense of the
taxpayer.
Despite the pronounced benefits of an algorithm-based bail
determination process, many jurisdictions remain slow to embrace
the reformed methodology in favor of the outdated procedures. They
may be wary of a loss of discretion in the hands of their judges, or
perhaps concerned with the notion of a formula systematically
identifying groups of people as future offenders of criminal activity.
The reality is that algorithms function as tools for judges to use in
order to most effectively protect their communities while ensuring
compliance with the criminal justice system. Bail reform legislation
has been successful as a result of “a growing awareness that too
many low-risk defendants stay behind bars because they are poor
while too many dangerous defendants exploit the money bail system
and are released with little to no supervision.”191 When implemented
correctly through data-driven, proven analysis, risk assessment
algorithms provide an answer to the question of how to correct the
present inequities that exist in the traditional method of following a
bail schedule corresponding to the offense committed and not the
individual being detained.
https://www.law.umich.edu/FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FacID=israelj
(last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
189
Israel, supra note 150, at 5.
190
Id. at 19–21.
191
Cherise Fanno Burdeen, Pretrial Justice Demands Less Money, More
Values, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2016, at 21, 23.

